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Restoring the Proclamation: Abraham
Lincoln, Confiscation, and Emancipation
in the Civil War Era
ALLEN C. GUELZO*
Like the business cycle, the reputations of great actors in history
seem to go through alternating periods of boom and bust.  Harry Tru-
man was scorned in his day as an incompetent bumbler.  A half-cen-
tury later, he is regarded as a gutsy and principled president.  Andrew
Jackson was hailed as the champion of the common man and the en-
emy of power-mad bankers.  Since the 1970s, he has become the
champion only of the White man, a rancid hater of Indians, and a
leering political monstrosity.  John Quincy Adams was, for more than
a century after his death, dismissed as a dyspeptic holier-than-thou;
however, a single book, William Lee Miller’s Arguing About Slavery,
and a single movie, Steven Spielberg’s Amistad, re-made him into an
apostle of the American anti-slavery conscience.  Perhaps this shows
only that historical reputations may be made of the same stuff as mar-
kets, and that over-investment and over-extension always leads to col-
lapse and recession.  Or perhaps it shows that the only way the
attention of a generation can be grabbed by historians is to contradict,
as loudly as possible, the historical certainties of the preceding one.
Either way, no historical figure carries an exemption to this, and
that includes Abraham Lincoln.  From being the Great Emancipator,
Lincoln has fallen to being a half-hearted emancipator whose decision
to free the slaves was dictated by political expediency, his passion to
save the Union, or the opportunity to recruit Black bodies to fill
Union ranks and save White ones.  It is difficult to pick up any survey
textbook of the Civil War era today and not find one or more of these
motives attached to Lincoln as the “real” reason why he issued the
Emancipation Proclamation or to hear, repeated over and over again,
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Richard Hofstadter’s cynical dismissal of the Proclamation as having
“all the moral grandeur of a bill of lading.”1  At best, Lincoln gets
one-handed applause for being an astute reader of the political tea-
leaves; at worst, he is an opportunistic racist whose Proclamation was
extorted from him by circumstances or by multitudes of self-emanci-
pating runaways.
Professor Fabrikant’s lengthy and careful legal analysis of Con-
gressional emancipation places him securely within this new consen-
sus.2  Although Professor Fabrikant is anxious to avoid identification
with the most extreme statements of the Lincoln-haters, at the end of
the day he nevertheless comes to almost the same conclusion as Ler-
one Bennett (of Ebony magazine fame): Lincoln’s contribution to
emancipation has been vastly over-rated, and the contributions of
Congress (principally through the Confiscation Acts) and the “contra-
bands” (through self-emancipation) correspondingly under-rated.3
Fabrikant argues that:
a) Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation was “redundant with leg-
islation already enacted by Congress”4 so that the Proclamation
was merely ratifying what Congress, with far better motives, had
achieved through legislation.  According to Professor Fabrikant,
Congress had recognized that the Civil War created a new consti-
tutional and statutory environment which permitted seizures and
confiscation of private property that otherwise would have re-
mained inviolate, and thus marched past Lincoln, who only
seemed worried about constitutional niceties which the war had
rendered irrelevant; and
b) that the Proclamation was redundant because it amounted in
practical terms to no more than Lincoln’s recognition of a fait
accompli by the slaves, who freed themselves by deserting the
Confederacy to claim freedom behind Union lines or in the
Union army.  This “self-emancipation by fugitive slaves” was
“widespread and irreversible well before the Proclamation was
issued.”5
1. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO
MADE IT 130 (6th prtg. 1985).
2. See Robert Fabrikant, Emancipation and the Proclamation: Of Contrabands, Congress,
and Lincoln, 49 HOW. L.J. 313  (2006).
3. See LERONE BENNETT JR., FORCED INTO GLORY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S WHITE DREAM
624 (2000).
4. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 314.
5. Id.
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As one final note, Fabrikant adds that the reputation of the Proc-
lamation cannot even be salvaged as a humanitarian gesture because
of Lincoln’s “racialism” and “many other reasons.”6  Fabrikant is
aware that Lincoln himself put a very different construction on all of
these matters, but Fabrikant insists that Lincoln’s own protestations
are not to be admitted as qualifying evidence because he was “corre-
spondingly short on candor.”7
Let me say at the outset that Professor Fabrikant is certainly cor-
rect in understanding that the war posed two significant questions on
the path to emancipating slaves and abolishing the institution:8
1) Did the Constitution bar the federal government from inter-
fering with slavery in states where it was legalized, and did this
change with the war situation?
2) Was “the Union . . . obligated to comply with the constitu-
tional and statutory provisions” which mandated the capture
and rendition of fugitive slaves, and did this situation also
change with the war?9
Professor Fabrikant says that in both cases the Civil War did
change the nature of these obligations.  He offers as his principal legal
proof the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Prize Cases, a combined
suit by the owners of ships and cargoes seized as prizes by the federal
naval blockade of the Confederacy in 1861.10  Under the conventions
of war, a blockade was an interdiction imposed by one sovereign na-
tion on the commerce of another sovereign nation on the high seas.11
But Lincoln insisted, from his inaugural address in March 1861 on-
wards, that the secession of the Southern states (to form the Confed-
erate States of America) was unconstitutional, and therefore legally
null and void; hence, the Confederate States of America could not be
a sovereign nation, but was only a domestic insurrection.
Unhappily, the proper response under international law to a do-
mestic insurrection was a “closure of ports” by the sovereign nation,
6. Fabrikant supra note 2, at 316.
7. Id.
8. Which, incidentally, is a distinction Professor Fabrikant does not make, but which will
offer serious complications in situations where slaves are freed at a given moment, but slavery
itself is allowed to remain legal for the future.  That problem, however, lies separate from Profes-
sor Fabrikant’s focus on the Proclamation, and so will not be further explored in this short space.
9. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 317.
10. Id. at 319.
11. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED
BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1887, at 68 (1887); see STEPHEN R. WISE, LIFELINE OF
THE CONFEDERACY: BLOCKADE RUNNING DURING THE CIVIL WAR 24-25 (1988).
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which is a much weaker measure.  Lincoln might have called for a
“closure of parts,” but that would have negligibly affected the Confed-
erate war effort, compared to the tight seal formed by a full-scale
blockade.12  Lincoln decided to straddle the fence, insisting that the
Confederacy was only an insurrection, and imposed a blockade any-
way.13  Almost immediately, this brought a concession of belligerent
rights to the Confederacy from Great Britain, and the spate of federal
lawsuits which became the Prize Cases.  It also allowed the federal
Navy to strangle the Confederacy’s commerce, and in 1863, the Su-
preme Court ruled against the plaintiffs in the Prize Cases,14 which
signaled to the Lincoln administration that it could have its cake and
eat it too.15 This, for Fabrikant, suggests that if prizes on the high seas
could thus be confiscated then: (a) the “war situation” would also per-
mit wide-spread confiscation of slave “property”; (b) Lincoln’s hesita-
tions about moving to emancipation through confiscation were
groundless; and (c) that Congress, by moving first to confiscate slave
“property,” was far ahead of Lincoln’s curve toward emancipation.16
However, there are two major problems, one short and one long,
with this reasoning and with Professor Fabrikant’s argument as a
whole.  First, the short one: the Prize Cases was not decided by the
Supreme Court until March, 1863, long after Lincoln moved to issue
his Proclamation.  In other words, the Prize Cases was unavailable in
1862, when Lincoln wrote the Proclamation, to show him how pre-
sumably groundless his fears were about outright confiscation.  In fact,
the Prize Cases was a 5-4 decision which squeaked past only because
Lincoln had appointed two justices to the court; the rest of the court
was made up of Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and three of the justices
who had delivered the Dred Scott decision in 1857.17  If the Prize
Cases was to do the work Fabrikant believes it did, then Lincoln
12. LANCE DAVIS & STANLEY ENGERMAN, NAVAL BLOCKADES IN PEACE AND WAR: AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY SINCE 1750, at 6-8, 116-18 (2006); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Closure of Ports
in Control of Insurgents, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 70 (1930).
13. Abraham Lincoln, By the President of the United States  of America – A Proclamation,
April 19, 1961, in 4 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES IN THE WAR
OF THE REBELLION 156-57 (Richard Rush et al. eds., 1896).
14. 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
15. J. G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 61-62 (rev. ed. 1964);
Ludwell H. Johnson, The Confederacy: What Was It? A View from the Federal Courts, 32 CIV.
WAR HIST. 1, 5-7 (1986).
16. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 317.
17. CARL BRENT SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-
64, at 880 (1974); Ludwell H. Johnson, Abraham Lincoln and the Development of Presidential
War-Making Powers: Prize Cases (1863) Revisited, 35 CIV. WAR HIST. 220 (1989).
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would have been well-justified in waiting until mid-1863 to learn
which way the decision would fall and perhaps until later to be sure
that subsequent cases developed larger and more secure majorities in
the Supreme Court.
The longer problem, however, is whether the Congressional legis-
lation which Fabrikant believes accomplished emancipation on its own
long before Lincoln issued his Proclamation really achieved the tri-
umphs of emancipation which he imputes to them.  For the sake of
clarity, I would like to consider each piece of this Congressional legis-
lation on its own terms.
THE FIRST CONFISCATION ACT
Professor Fabrikant singles out the First Confiscation Act (FCA)
of August 1861 as the first legislation that “had the purpose and effect
of emancipating slaves.”18  I am sure that in the minds of some of the
bill’s authors, this is exactly what they hoped it would do.  But as Pro-
fessor Fabrikant admits, the FCA was a confiscation statute, not an
emancipation statute.19  It declared “confiscated” by the federal gov-
ernment any slaves who fell into federal hands and who were found to
have been employed by Confederate forces in any military fashion
(the construction of fortification, teamster and camp duties, and so
forth).20  The FCA, however, did not declare anyone actually emanci-
pated.  Any slave thus “confiscated” may have felt that confiscation’s
“practical effect”21 was to emancipate him, but the de facto result of
the FCA did not have the statutory force of the legislation’s de jure
language.22  Even Fabrikant admits that the FCA “did not expressly
grant that right”23 because such confiscations were expressly banned
by the Constitution’s exclusion of bills of attainder.24  The control
over those slaves “confiscated” by federal authorities through the
18. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 322.
19. Id.
20. HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREED-
MEN’S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866, at 7-9 (2000).
21. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 324.
22. A municipal ordinance which de jure bans prostitution within municipal limits does not
thereby give prostitution legal sanction if a “house of ill-fame” moves over the municipal bound-
ary and continues de facto operation there.
23. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 324.
24. John Syrett, The Confiscation Acts: Efforts at Reconstruction during the Civil War 6-7
(1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file with author).
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FCA could only be a life estate; otherwise, the “property” passed to
the owner’s heirs with the title intact.25
Professor Fabrikant would, I suspect, object at this point that the
War had introduced the new age of interpretation, confirmed in 1863
by the Prize Cases.  Even if the Prize Cases had been available as pre-
cedent in 1861, the capture of prizes on the high seas was clearly un-
derstood to be a different matter entirely from the confiscation of
property on land.  This was demonstrated in Alexander v. United
States, when the Supreme Court held that cotton confiscated from
Mrs. Elizabeth Alexander’s Louisiana plantation could not be consid-
ered prize of war and that the proceeds from the sale of her cotton
should have been held in trust for her.26  Fabrikant goes far enough to
admit that “there is much reason to doubt the constitutionality of the
FCA’s forfeiture provisions insofar as it applied to Union citizens,”
because that would have amounted to an attainder.27  But here is
where we are confronted with the really critical question–what was
the legal status of the Confederacy?  Strictly speaking, there was no
such thing as a “Union citizen”—all citizens, including those in rebel-
lion, were still considered U.S. citizens because the Confederacy was
only an insurrection and not a sovereign entity.  Consequently, legisla-
tive confiscation of the property of rebels—not “citizens of the Con-
federacy,” because legally there was no such nation-state as the
Confederacy and therefore no Confederate citizens—amounted to an
attainder.  Hence, Fabrikant could not be more right when he con-
cedes that the FCA “appears to constitute a Bill of Attainder.”28  It
does not merely appear; it is.29
25. HENRY WAGER HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES REGULATING THE INTER-
COURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 447 (1861).
26. See 69 U.S. 663 (1865).
27. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 325; see Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415, 418 (1880), and
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869); see also John Maxcey Zane, Lincoln the Constitu-
tional Lawyer, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N PAPERS 92 (1933) (stating categorically, “the alle-
giance of all the revolted citizens to the United States remained. It was never changed.”).
28. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 325.
29. Fabrikant cites Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268 (1871), to show that the confiscation
statutes were eventually decided not to be an attainder. Id. at 326.  But the decision in Miller
was rendered in 1871 and was no help to Lincoln in 1863.  Id.  Chief Justice William Strong in
fact specified that under the confiscation acts, “rebels” were held to be members of a class apart
from “citizens,” but this was a determination made under the “warpowers” of Congress—
whatever they were. Id. at 313-14.  Even then, the Court was by no means unanimous: Justice
Stephen Field wrote a dissent which denied that private property was ever subject to confiscation
under the laws of nations. Id. at 314.
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THE ADDITIONAL ARTICLE OF WAR
I am sympathetic to Professor Fabrikant’s observation that the
Additional Article of War30 (AAW) has received “scant attention
from Civil War scholars” for its emancipatory implications;31 I am
among those who have not given the AAW its full rights in the eman-
cipation story.  Professor Fabrikant is also right to observe that it
“sent a message” to slaves behind Confederate lines that the Union
military now “constituted a safe haven.”32  The pro-slavery Maryland
Senator (and Washington College law professor), James A. Pearce,
complained that the AAW was “an invitation to all the slaves of the
State of Maryland, who can do so, to resort to the camp, sure of pro-
tection there . . . because no officer of the army can order their deliv-
ery up to their master, however loyal or however indisputable his title
may be to that slave.”33  But granting a slave “safe haven” was not the
same as emancipating him; runaway slaves had been finding “safe
havens” all along the Underground Railroad for decades before the
Civil War, but every one of them was liable to capture and rendition
the moment a slave owner or his agents tracked him down.34  Sending
“a message” about Congress’ preferences is not the same thing as stat-
utory emancipation; even the benighted Senator Pearce understood:
“It is not an act of emancipation in its terms.”35
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  EMANCIPATION
Professor Fabrikant believes that Lincoln “opposed all measures
calling for the abolition [of slavery] in the District,” and thus left it to
Congress to take the initiative in drafting and passing the first outright
emancipation statute, ending slavery in the District of Columbia in
30. Act of Dec. 2, 1861, ch. 40, 12 Stat. 354 (1862).
31. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 331.
32. Id.
33. HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY MEASURES OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH
AND THIRTY-EIGHTH UNITED STATES CONGRESSES, 1861-1864, at 25 (1864).
34. Act of Dec. 3, 1849, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
35. WILSON, supra note 33, at 25 (1864).  I think I should say, also, that it is not clear what
crime Lincoln committed against the AAW by what Fabrikant calls his “acquiescence” to it.
Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 334.  Far from acquiescence, Lincoln promised he would never return
to slavery any slave who has obtained de facto freedom.  “The Negro who has once touched the
hem of the government’s Garment,” Lincoln told Wendell Phillips in March, 1862, “shall never
again be a slave,” in RECOLLECTED WORDS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356 (Don E. & Virginia
Fehrenbacher eds., 1996).  This is not enough for Professor Fabrikant: “He failed to instruct his
generals not to play ‘negro catcher.’”  Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 355.  This would come as a
surprise to the principal offender, George McClellan, whom Lincoln fired in November 1862.
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April 1862.36  That Lincoln opposed immediate abolition (in the Dis-
trict and elsewhere) is true—Lincoln had always been a gradualist,
and he commented to Horace Greeley that although “[he] would be
glad to see it abolished,” he preferred that any emancipation of the
District’s slaves “have three main features – gradual – compensation –
and [the] vote of the people.”37  But Lincoln never doubted “the au-
thority of Congress to abolish slavery in this District” and during his
solitary term in the House of Representatives in 1847-49, “he drew up,
and sought to get before the House of Representatives, at that session,
a bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, upon the
conditions that the abolition should be gradual, and only upon a vote
of the majority of the people of the District, and with compensation to
unwilling owners.”38  Far from opposing District emancipation in
1862, he was “gratified” that the act largely conformed to his notion.
This, again, is not enough for Professor Fabrikant, who laments that
Lincoln did not accompany his signing of the bill with a statement of
“moral concerns.”39  To which I can only ask in mystification: Why did
he need to?  This was a statute, not a sermon.  And later on in his
article, Fabrikant admits that Lincoln’s emancipatory powers were
“based upon the exercise of executive war powers . . . not humanita-
rian reasons.  Such a legal assessment is undoubtedly correct and it
appears that Lincoln accepted this legal constraint.”40  If this is “cor-
rect,” why then does Professor Fabrikant fault Lincoln for failing to
pen a moral or “humanitarian” statement to his signing of the bill?
THE SECOND CONFISCATION ACT
The Second Confiscation Act of July 1862 (SCA)41 was, at last, a
genuinely emancipatory piece of legislation, since it identified six cate-
gories of treason and declared that the slaves of the guilty “be deemed
captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not
again held as slaves.”42  It is worth noting, however, that the slaves
thus emancipated had to belong to slaveowners who fell into the six
36. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 335.
37. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Mar. 24, 1861), in 5 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers University Press 1953).
38. Abraham Lincoln, Fragments of an Answer to John Hill (Sept. 1860), in 4 THE COL-
LECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 108.
39. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 337.
40. Id. at 401 n.350.
41. Act of July 17, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
42. Id. at 591.
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categories and had either escaped into Union lines or been captured
“from such persons or deserted by them and coming under the control
of the Government of the United States.”43  This was a noble aspira-
tion, but the aspiration concealed a clumsy enforcement apparatus
and limited application.  To genuinely emancipate anyone, the slave-
owner would have to be identified legally as a traitor; how this was to
be accomplished in the middle of the war in which the traitors were
unavailable to answer a summons was not explained, which is why the
SCA had to provide for in rem proceedings.44  An in rem proceeding
stretched the credibility of the action; what stretched it still more was
the continuing problem posed by the resemblance of this bill, like the
FCA, to attainder.  Lincoln did not believe the SCA to be a “formal
attainder,” but it had the shape of one all the same, and so he added,
“I feel constrained to say I think this feature of the act is unconstitu-
tional,” and he signed the SCA only with the understanding that no
such “forfeiture extending beyond the life of the guilty parties” was
intended.45  Otherwise, both bills would only feed an industry of post-
war federal law suits over slaves as well as “real or landed estate,”
and, in fact, this is exactly what happened.46
Although the number of forfeiture cases under the SCA was not
large, their litigation history was long and contentious.47  In the case
of Benjamin Dykes, a Georgian whose land was seized by the Confed-
erate government to create the infamous Andersonville prison camp,
and was seized again by the federal government to create a national
cemetery, Dykes eventually won a judgment against the War Depart-
ment in 1875, and failed only to win a subsequent suit to recover the
rental value of the land during the years it was possessed by the fed-
eral government.  Litigation concerning a New Orleans city lot owned
by Confederate diplomat John Slidell, and confiscated by the federal
government, lasted until 1906, some thirty-five years after Slidell’s
43. THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE GREAT
REBELLION 196 (Edward McPherson ed., 1864); 18 STAT. 589 (1861). The original form of the
SCA actually had more broad-based emancipation language, but this was deleted, after vigorous
debate, in the final form of the SCA. See DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY:
PROPERTY CONFISCATION IN THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVIL WAR 71
(2006).
44. See PHILIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 146 (1994).
45. Abraham Lincoln, To the Senate and House of Representatives (July 17, 1862), in 5
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 327.
46. See PHILIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND
EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 39 (1975).
47. Frank J. Williams, “Doing Less” and “Doing More,” in HAROLD HOLZER ET AL., THE
EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: THREE VIEWS 57-60 (2006).
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death.48 Anyone who imagines that Southerners would have been less
persistent in trying to recover slave “property” seized under the SCA
has a more magnanimous and benign view of White Southern slave-
holders than I do, or than Lincoln did.
Why, then, did Congress bother to pass the confiscation acts at
all, if their constitutional premise was so plainly defective?  For the
same reason that Congress and other legislatures routinely pass legis-
lation (like bills against flag-burning) which have no chance of surviv-
ing a legal challenge in the federal courts, but which make for good
political theater, or which keep the temperature on a particular issue
high.  “The confiscation act was more useful as a declaration of policy
than as an act to be enforced,” acknowledged Ohio Senator John
Sherman.49  Even the confiscation bills’ architect in the Senate, Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois, admitted that “far from striking at all the prop-
erty of each and every citizen in the seceded States, [the SCA] would
not probably reach the property of one in ten of the rebels, and in no
case would touch the property of a loyal citizen.”50  This does not give
us much confidence that the confiscation legislation would have ac-
complished anything permanent, or that it was expected to.  No won-
der, then, that Congress, despite the passage of the confiscation bills,
lined up to pass a resolution endorsing the Emancipation Proclama-
tion on December 15, 1862—which looks surprisingly strange if they
believed that their own bills had already accomplished its goal.51
Professor Fabrikant believes (and this is the common thread that
runs through his treatment of all four statutes) that Lincoln’s reluc-
tance to emancipate was controlled by a false theory of sovereignty—
that Lincoln was wrong to believe that the Confederacy was a legal
fiction and that property held in the Confederate states was still cov-
ered by the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.  This appears absurd
to Professor Fabrikant because “the international law of war permit-
ted the Union to treat innocent, loyal citizens of the Confederacy in
precisely the same manner as their rebel neighbors,”52 and thus sanc-
tioned broad-based emancipation by means of Congressional confisca-
48. For an extensive discussion of post-war litigation arising out of confiscation proceedings,
see GREG H. WILLIAMS, CIVIL WAR SUITS IN THE U.S. COURT OF CLAIMS: CASES INVOLVING
COMPENSATION TO NORTHERNERS AND SOUTHERNERS FOR WARTIME LOSSES (2006).
49. JOHN SHERMAN, JOHN SHERMAN’S RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE,
SENATE AND CABINET: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 316 (1895).
50. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1557 (1862).
51. Id. 3d Sess. 92.
52. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 345.
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tion statutes.  Lincoln’s opposition to these statutes was, consequently,
an act either of willful ignorance or else covert opposition to the en-
tire emancipation project.  There is, however, no citation in
Fabrikant’s argument to any such “international law of war” that sanc-
tioned the kind of confiscations embodied in the four statutes.53  The
major American treatises on international law—Henry Wheaton’s El-
ements of International Law54 and Henry Wager Halleck’s Interna-
tional Law; or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and
War55—indicated precisely the opposite.  Wheaton, for instance, ex-
empted “private property on land . . . from confiscation” in time of
war and categorically forbade applying the rules of prize in “maritime
warfare” to “the operations of war by land.”56  So did the Captured
and Abandoned Properties Act of 1863, which defined the federal
government’s relationship to the Southern people as “a trustee of
funds generated from the sale of their property.”57
Rather than the niceties of “international law,” Fabrikant instead
believes that “Lincoln was influenced by politics, not principle, with
respect to this important issue.”58  Lincoln had, in other words, no real
interest in emancipation, and issued the Emancipation Proclamation
only because playing catch-up to Congress seemed to be the politically
expedient thing to do.  Actually, Lincoln was influenced by both polit-
ics and principle, and, perhaps, it is precisely the possibility that these
two should mutually act on each other that is Fabrikant’s basic diffi-
culty in understanding Lincoln.  After all, if Lincoln had really har-
bored the unmixed degree of unprincipled “callousness to slaves-in-
distress” of which Fabrikant accuses him, then he would have had no
reason, and no need, to issue an emancipation proclamation at all.59
What is more, despite his legal doubts about the standing of the con-
53. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 345.  The only “international law of war,” which existed
before the Declaration of Paris in 1856, was found in (a) the various exchanges of stated policies
issued by belligerents, such as the British ‘Orders in Council’ during the Napoleonic Wars, and
the corresponding French responses, and (b) the body of commentary from the pens of theoreti-
cal jurists, principally Pufendorf and Grotius.  It is worth noting in this regard that Grotius rec-
ognized no legitimacy to confiscation in war, but only the immunity of belligerents from
punishment in the event of property destruction or the theft of property. See STEPHEN C. NEFF,
WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 147-51 (2005).
54. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A SKETCH OF THE HIS-
TORY OF THE SUBJECT (Richard Henry Dana ed., 1836).
55. HALLECK, supra note 25.
56. Wheaton, supra ntoe 54, at 436.
57. ROBERT BRUCE MURRAY, LEGAL CASES OF THE CIVIL WAR (2003); WHEATON, supra
note 54, at 362, 379.
58. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 356.
59. Id. at 357.
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fiscation legislation, Lincoln acknowledged that “by virtue of the act
of Congress entitled ‘An act to confiscate property used for insurrec-
tionary purposes,’ approved August, 6, 1861, the legal claims of cer-
tain persons to the labor and service of certain other persons have
become forfeited.”60 Forfeited—not emancipated.  But at the same
moment, Lincoln opposed the rendition of fugitives, whether they
were forfeit or not.  “Numbers of the latter, thus liberated, are already
dependent on the United States, and must be provided for in some
way.”61  With that phrase—thus liberated—Lincoln turned a blind eye,
in the name of freedom, to his own legal scruples.62
What the multitude of impatient critics of Lincoln on emancipa-
tion seem to miss is that, if he was as uninterested, as racist, as cynical,
or as political as they claim, his best option would have been to not
write the Emancipation Proclamation.  There were no mass meetings
of Northern Whites demanding freedom for Black slaves.  There were,
however, riots in Northern cities over fear of competition from free
Black labor.63 Democratic Congressman William Allen complained on
the floor of the House of Representatives that “[t]housands of ne-
groes have been taken, decoyed or stolen” and transported North to
take the jobs of White workingmen.64  The North “must either be the
home of [W]hite men or [B]lack men—they cannot dwell together!”65
There were no soldiers’ parades with banners urging Lincoln to end
slavery.  There were, however, mutinies in regiments and mutterings
about a coup d’etat by George McClellan and the Army of the Poto-
mac.66  There were no resolutions from state legislatures, calling on
Lincoln to emancipate.  There were, however, resolutions in the legis-
lature of his home state, denouncing emancipation and calling for a
peace conference to end the war.  “All the democratic members of the
legislature are open secessionists,” wrote one anxious Illinoisan.67
60. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861), in 5 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 48.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. V. JACQUE VOGELI, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL: THE MIDWEST AND THE NEGRO DURING
THE CIVIL WAR 34-35 (1967).
64. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 182 (1862).
65. Id.
66. General M.C. Meigs on the Conduct of the Civil War, 26 AM. HIST. REV. 294 (1920-21).
67. Letter from Mercy Levering Conkling to Clinton Conkling (Jan. 11, 1863), in JAMES C.
& CLINTON L. CONKLING PAPERS, available at Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library & Mu-
seum, http://hip.rpls.ws/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=spisalp#focus (search “Conkling Papers” follow
hyperlink “Papers, 1838-1920”).
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“They talked about going to Washington, hurling Mr. Lincoln from
the presidential chair, and inaugurating civil war north.”68
On those terms, Lincoln could, conceivably, have let the Congres-
sional statutes move forward and allowed Congressional Republicans
to take the subsequent heat—and heat there was, as Congressional
Republicans learned in the off-year elections in November 1862, when
emancipation cost them thirty-one seats in the House of Representa-
tives.  Or he could have moved into outright opposition to emancipa-
tion, and thus won accolades from Northern Democrats and avoided
intervention from the British, who feared that emancipation would
trigger a race war.69  That Lincoln did neither argues a much more
forward position on emancipation than Fabrikant imagines.  It may be
true, as Professor Fabrikant says, that “[h]e had an antipathy for
emancipation on any other terms than his own”70—as if he should
have enjoyed being contradicted on matters of public policy.  And it
may be true that “Lincoln thought he knew better than Congress what
the pace and manner of emancipation should be”71—but so has every
other President on every other major issue.  This is why the federal
system is composed of checks and balances.
Professor Fabrikant has displayed a remarkable command of, and
patience with, the technicalities of the Congressional statutes.  He
does not, however, display a corresponding grasp of the historical
pressures which acted on the people who had to deal with those stat-
utes.  Too many accounts of Lincoln’s half-heartedness over emanci-
pation occur in a historical vacuum, as though Lincoln was perfectly
free to make whatever decision he liked, free of restraint, and free of
any reckoning of the consequences.72  If that were the case, then Lin-
coln’s march to emancipation really does look halting, but this is simi-
lar to criticizing Lance Armstrong for pedaling too slowly while
pretending that one does not see that he is climbing Mont Blanc.  Cer-
tainly one constraint to which Lincoln had to be attentive was the Su-
preme Court.  Far from the Prize Cases demonstrating how much
latitude he had in confiscating rebel property, the 5-4 vote in the Prize
Cases actually underscores what very thin judicial ice confiscation was
68. Letter from Mercy Levering Conkling to Clinton Conkling, supra note 69.
69. See HOWARD JONES, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE UNION
AND SLAVERY IN THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CIVIL WAR 61, 84 (1999).
70. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 362.
71. Id.
72. Allen C. Guelzo, How Abe Lincoln Lost the Black Vote: Lincoln and Emancipation in
the African American Mind, 25 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 1, 15-19 (2004).
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skating on.  For the fact was that, in the first two years of the war, the
Supreme Court was very much Roger B. Taney’s Court and the Court
of Dred Scott, and it would have been folly to have expected Taney, an
old Jacksonian Democrat, to lay aside his pro-slavery and anti-Repub-
lican prejudices.73  Had a poorly-crafted emancipation decree or a
confiscation statute that veered toward an attainder come before Ta-
ney on appeal, there would have been no telling what kind of an open-
ing this would have afforded Taney to seal off slavery judicially for the
next political generation (just as he had tried to do so expansively in
Dred Scott).  Lincoln had already defied one attempt at Supreme
Court meddling in 1861 in Ex parte Merryman,74 but at least he had
some constitutional grounds for ignoring Taney’s writ of habeas
corpus for John Merryman, the Confederate recruiter.75  Lincoln
could not forever ignore the Supreme Court; not only did ignoring the
Supreme Court grate against his own legal sensibilities, but it handed
to the Democratic opposition stick after stick with which to beat
Republicans at the polls.  Against this background, Lincoln begins to
look less like the unwilling emancipator and more like the careful
strategist he really was, circling the bleeding bull of slavery and avoid-
ing impalement by its horns.
Oddly enough, Professor Fabrikant believes that “there is no rea-
son to think that Lincoln was looking over his shoulder at the Su-
preme Court when he issued the Emancipation Proclamation and/or
when he declined to modify it.”76  And he accuses me of showing no
evidence, in Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slav-
ery in America,77 “that Lincoln’s decisions were influenced by a con-
cern that federal courts were looking over his shoulder.”78  However,
there is ample evidence that this was very much at the front of his
mind.  “I think it [the Proclamation] is valid in law,” Lincoln told Gen-
eral Stephen Hurlbut, after issuing the Emancipation Proclamation,
73. See JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND
THE WAR POWERS 222 (2006).
74. 17 F. Cas. 144, 151-52 (C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
75. MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBER-
TIES 10-11 (1991).
76. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 382.
77. ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: THE END OF SLAVERY
IN AMERICA 171-72 (2004) (dealing with opinions and cases which did threaten court interfer-
ence in emancipation).
78. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 394.
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but he was worried about whether it “will be so held by the courts.”79
Two years later, he was still uncertain about the possibility of litigation
over emancipation.  Once the shooting stopped, emancipation became
“a judicial question.  How the courts would decide it, he did not know
and could give no answer.”80
[Lincoln’s] opinion was that as the proclamation was a war measure
and would have effect only from its being an exercise of the war
power, as soon as the war ceased, it would be inoperative for the
future.  It would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come
under its operation while it was in active exercise.  This was his indi-
vidual opinion, but the courts might decide the other way and hold
that it effectually emancipated all the slaves in the states to which it
applied at the time.  So far as he was concerned, he should leave it
to the courts to decide.  He never would change or modify the terms
of the proclamation in the slightest particular.81
Professor Fabrikant seems to believe that these apprehensions
were merely smoke-screens and that Lincoln had no reason to believe
that “a post-war repeal or withdrawal of . . . the Proclamation” could
have led to the re-enslavement of those “who had already attained
freedom.”82  If so, Fabrikant grossly underestimates the depth of
White racism; he also has not paid very much attention to Reconstruc-
tion and Jim Crow, since Jim Crow imposed on Southern Blacks a
brutal and oppressive peonage which fell little short of slavery itself—
and it did so largely through the actions of the courts.83  How wise is it
to assume that this same perverted energy which went into the making
of Southern segregation and Plessy v. Ferguson84 might not have been
applied to re-enslaving runaway slaves or appealing for federal com-
pensation for unrecoverable runaways?
That same sense of operating in a historical vacuum also under-
cuts Fabrikant’s assertion that “Lincoln’s only unwavering goal was
preservation of the Union,” and that “[e]mancipation was adopted be-
latedly as a means to achieve that goal”85—as if the preservation of
the Union was not itself a means to emancipation after 1860.  The
79. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Stephen A. Hurlburt (July 31, 1863), in 6 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 358.
80. Alexander H. Stephens, in RECOLLECTED WORDS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN supra note
35, at 421.
81. Id.
82. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 390.
83. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 70-71 (1955).
84. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
85. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 392.
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election that brought Lincoln into the White House was the first elec-
tion since 1800 in which Southern voting power, buttressed by the ad-
ded representation that the “Three-fifths Clause” awarded the South
in the Electoral College, finally failed to elect a pro-slavery Presi-
dent.86  From that point onwards, it was apparent that the growing
population of the Northern Free States would inexorably put the
power to elect presidents into Northern hands.  If those presidents
were, like Lincoln, anti-slavery by conviction, then the South had
nothing to look forward to but a steady loss of control over federal
patronage, seats in Congress, and ultimately its ability to keep the free
states from enacting legislation that would eventually eliminate slav-
ery.  Just how much Southerners had to fear from Lincoln on this
score became apparent within eight months of his inauguration, when
he devised a plan which offered Delaware, a slave state which had
opted to remain within the Union, a federally-funded buy-out for the
state’s slaves, if the state legislature would enact the appropriate legis-
lation.87  This was the handwriting on the wall for slavery—the temp-
tation of federal money would start a collapse of slavery among the
weak sisters of the border-states, and that, in turn, would set up a
domino effect which would soon see Deep South states stampeding to
the federal till for buy-out money before their slaves lost all value.
“Southerners were convinced that to restrict slavery was to constrict
[their] life blood,” wrote the Confederate partisan-turned-Republican,
John Singleton Mosby: “The South went to war on account of slav-
ery. . . .  South Carolina went to war—as she said in her secession
proclamation—because slavery w[oul]d not be secure under Lin-
coln.”88  Why, after all, did the Southern states secede from the Union
in 1860, unless they saw that remaining in the Union would be the
downfall of the slave system?  Every time Lincoln pledged to restore
the Union, Southerners only heard a promise to exterminate slavery—
and they were right.  Far from Union and emancipation being parallel
or divergent strategies, they were really converging ones.  “The proc-
lamation became the heart and soul of a revolutionary action,” writes
Howard Jones, “that soon established emancipation as an integral part
86. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 125-
26 (1982).
87. Lincoln, “Drafts of a Bill for Compensated Emancipation in Delaware,” Nov. 26, 1861,
5 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 29.
88. James O. Horton, Confronting Slavery and Revealing the ‘Lost Cause,’ 4 CRM: THE
JOURNAL OF HERITAGE STEWARDSHIP 18, 19 (1998).
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of the administration’s steady movement toward an even better
Union.”89
The rabbit Professor Fabrikant must finally pull out of the hat in
order to prove Lincoln’s bad faith on emancipation finally comes
down to “the fact that Lincoln’s dislike of Blacks was a prominent
part of his approach to emancipation.”90  This is said without the
slightest sense of the contradiction that statement embodies.  I cannot
repeat this often enough: if Lincoln had so great a racist “antipathy”
toward Blacks, he simply did not have to emancipate anyone.  As
Fabrikant obligingly admits later on, the Emancipation Proclamation
actually had three constitutionally-risky aspects, and, therefore, Lin-
coln was resorting to some substantial, but unknown, constitutional
risks in issuing it.91  Why, then, did he do it?  Certainly it was not
because of pressure from the slaves themselves.  Professor Fabrikant
intimates that he will refer to the “self-emancipation thesis,” which
argues that so many hundreds of thousands of slaves ran away to
Union lines that Lincoln had no practical choice but to issue a Procla-
mation.92  But Fabrikant never actually developed this argument, and
there is good reason.  First, if the slaves were indeed busy emancipat-
ing themselves by running away from their Southern masters, then this
gave Lincoln even less reason to issue an emancipation proclamation,
since the work of emancipation was being done quite well by the
slaves themselves.  Second, there is, unhappily, no “revealing the
number of slaves who fled North, or who fled North in response to
either the FCA or the SCA.”93  If there were “hundred of thousands,”
then the supposition seems to be that they exerted some form of pre-
ponderating influence on Lincoln to throw away his hesitations, but
given the fact that none of these fugitives could vote, or that only the
tiniest fraction of free Northern Blacks could vote, it is hard to see
what pressure they were exerting on Lincoln.  There is also no hard
evidence that fugitive slaves in the Civil War numbered in the “hun-
dreds of thousands” or any other thousands.  Professor Fabrikant as-
sumes that “it is a commonly-accepted fact that hundreds of
89. JONES, supra note 69, at 146.
90. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 362.
91. Id. at 370-71.
92. Mark E. Neely, Lincoln and the Theory of Self-Emancipation, in THE CONTINUING
CIVIL WAR: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THE CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE OF CHICAGO 46-58 (John Y.
Simon & Barbara Hughett eds., 1992); See James M. McPherson, Who Freed the Slaves?, 139
PROCEEDINGS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 1-10 (Mar. 1995).
93. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 378 n.251.
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thousands of Blacks fled North before the end of the War, and that
the number of Blacks who fled steadily increased as the War per-
sisted.”94  But “commonly accepted” by whom?  And if there is no
study of the numbers of fugitives, on what grounds is “hundreds of
thousands” so “commonly accepted?”  Professor Fabrikant himself
later offers 700,000 as the number of fugitive slaves during the course
of the Civil War.95  In fact, this is guess-work, and fully as much guess-
work as Secretary of State William Seward’s off-hand estimate in 1865
that the number was closer to 200,000.96  And even if Fabrikant is
right, these runaways acquired no political leverage over Lincoln by
running away.  Certainly they were not being given the vote, nor did
they have representatives in Congress or the newspapers to give them
a voice.  Nor in fact did they gain any legal title to freedom under the
confiscation statutes.97  How, then, did they “self-emancipate”—apart,
of course, from Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation?
At the end, Professor Fabrikant has to resort to the oldest of old
canards about the Proclamation: “the Proclamation was geographi-
cally configured to keep slavery in place where Lincoln has the power
to abolish it, and to abolish it [only] in those places where he had no
such power.”98  What Fabrikant means by this is that Lincoln excluded
from the operation of the Proclamation the slaves of Border States
and the slaves of those districts of the Confederacy which had been
conquered and occupied by federal forces.  As a result, Lincoln incon-
sistently left the slaves under his control in slavery and freed those
over whom he had no control.  I confess surprise that a member of a
law faculty could repeat this without any qualification.  What “con-
trol,” exactly, did Lincoln have over slavery in the Border States?
Slavery, remember, was a matter of state law, not federal law, and
before the 14th Amendment and the incorporation doctrine, state law
existed beyond the reach of federal action—which is another reason
Lincoln was so eager to have the state legislatures take the emancipa-
tion step, because this would insulate emancipation from appeals to
the federal courts.  Similarly, what “control” did Lincoln have over
slavery in the occupied districts?  If he was to hew logically to the line
of argument, which denied the legality of secession, then every occu-
94. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 398 n.251.
95. Id. at 396.
96. William C. Harris, The Hampton Roads Peace Conference: A Final Test of Lincoln’s
Presidential Leadership, 21 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 31, 50 (2000).
97. BELZ, supra note 20, at 17.
98. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 369.
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pied district returned to civil order as soon as federal troops cleared it
of rebels and re-opened the civil courts.  The Emancipation Proclama-
tion, however, was issued on the strength of Lincoln’s “war powers,”
powers which ceased to operate the moment the civil courts re-
opened.  But the rebellious Confederacy was another matter—there,
all civil order had disappeared (or at least all order that the federal
government would recognize and assume responsibility for), and the
insurrectionary states would come directly under the authority of his
“war powers” as Commander-in-Chief.99  If the Proclamation, as a
“war powers” order, did not literally and immediately strike the
shackles off slaves in Confederate territory, that did not mean that
they had ceased de jure to be slaves any more than property stolen by
burglars ceases to be the property de jure of the burglary victim.
Fabrikant denies that this “frees where he can not and does not where
he can” nonsense is a canard,100 it is a foolish one, too, that no one
would resort to except as the last refuge of a bad argument.
The Emancipation Proclamation was no “weak after-thought” to
“Congress’ barrage of emancipatory legislation”101 since that legisla-
tion consisted of political gestures which the federal courts would
eventually take into their own hands.  “Notwithstanding the Procla-
mation’s exceptions and exemptions,” writes the renowned Lincoln
scholar and political scientist, Harry V. Jaffa, “it destroyed the viabil-
ity of the institution of chattel slavery in the whole Union,” while at
the same time it avoided the usurpation of powers which would “have
defeated the very ends of human freedom.”102  Nor was Lincoln a
closet racist who manipulated Black people merely to get the political
results he wanted, although I suppose it suits the temperament of
some people to believe that Black Americans must owe nothing to
White Americans, and vice versa.  The deciding moment in the freeing
of the slaves was, despite the confiscation legislation, the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation.  We may quibble as we like about whether Lin-
coln’s intentions were pure, or his methods impeccable.  What
mattered was the sheer enormous reality of the Emancipation Procla-
mation and at the bottom of that document appears this indispensable
name: Abraham Lincoln.
99. See generally WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 245 (1864).
100. Fabrikant, supra note 2, at 368.
101. Id. at 367.
102. HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING
OF THE CIVIL WAR  79 (2000).
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